We tbrmulate a mathematical model tbr the optimal control of the exchange rate under uncertainty. The control consists of a combination of: I. (continuous) stochastic control and 2. an impulse control.
Introduction
The research on target zone exchange rate regimes has progressed rapidly over the last few years. With a target zone regime the exchange rate is allowed to move within a specified band, and it is then customary to assume that the central bank intervenes to prevent the exchange rate from moving outside the band. Krugman (1987) introduced the standard target zone model. Here the exchange rate depends on both 'fundamentals' and on expectations about its future values. See Svensson (1992a ,Bertola (1994 and Garber and Svensson (1996) for a review of the relevant later literature.
This paper contributes to this literature by deriving the optimal intervention policy by the central bank in order to stabilize the exchange rate within its band. This policy comprises both interventions in the foreign exchange market, at selected times only, and a continuous control of the domestic interest rate level. We should, however, point out that our analysis below only depends on one of these instruments being used discretely, and the other continuously. Thus instead assuming interventions as occurring continuously, while changes in the interest rate occurring more periodically, is also possible to consider in our mathematical model.
We set up a model of optimal intervention policy for the central bank m a sir ..ti economy to find the optimal deviation of the exchange rate from the central parity of its band. We then derive an optimal interest rate differential between domestic and foreign interest rates (although the foreign interest rate level is taken as given), and the optimal time and amount of central-bank intervention in the foreign exchange market. The analysis ignores the issue of whether interventions are sterilized or unsterilized. Note also that we assume that speculators do not have information which allows them to infer the size or the timing of jumps in the exchange rate. This implies that the central bank never announces the amount of intervention, and speculators cannot anticipate risk-free profits at an infinite rate nor can they compete away possible arbitrage profits by exactly counteracting the intervention amount.
Our mathematical model consists of a combination of stochastic control and impulse control and we give sufficient conditions that a given function is the minimal expected cost function for the central bank and that the corresponding strategy is optimal. The model is illustrated by a specific example. The mathematical model presented has, however, greater generality, and can be app|ied to other economics problems that involve the combination of stochastic control and impulse control.
A brief review of the target-zone literature
The initial Krugman (1987 Krugman ( , 1991 model was based on a number of crucial assumptions. One is that the exchange rate target zone is perfectly credible, in the sense that market agents believe that the lower and upper edges of the band will remain fixed forever. Another is that the target zone is defended with interventions at its edges, and no interventions take place when the exchange rate is strictly inside the band (i.e. no intramarginal interventions). Following Krugmaa's methodology, Svensson (1991) finds a deterministic, non-linear inverse relationship between the exchange rate deviations from parity and interest rate differentials, which is flatter and less-non-linear for longer maturities, and which follows fiom the exchange rate band being credible. Most empirical evidence has, however, put into question the assumptions and conclusions of these models.
A number of questions remains unanswered, particularly following the last European exchange rate crisis in the fall of 1992. Among these are the issue of the optimal policy to maintain the currency band, and the optimal width of the currency band once adopted. The current paper deals with these two questions. The literature contains a few analyses related to ours. Svensson (1992b) studies a model of optimal intervention policy in a small open economy, where the cenmd bank minimizes a weighted sum of interest rate and exchange rate variability using as its only instrument foreign exchange interventions. He assumes a credible band, with a negative trade-off between interest rate smoothing and exchange rate variability. He then finds that there exists an optimal negative trade-off between exchange rate and interest rate variability. Miller and Zhang (1994) attempt to derive an optimal target zone, and assume that the costs of intervening in the foreign exchange rate market are proportional to the size of the intervention (as in Avesani, 1990) . They then find that the optimal policy is to stay within a given target zone, using marginal and infinitesimal interventions at the boundaries of the target zone in order to obtain a reflecting barrier.
In contrast with these papers, in our model the cost of each intervention is greater than a fixed, positive minimum, no matter how small the intervention. This leads to an optimal policy with discrete intervention episodes.
The model in the literature that most closely resembles ours is probably Jeanblanc-Picqu6 (1993) . She uses the mathematical theory of impulse control to show that there exists an optimal intervention policy (impulse control) which, under given intervention costs, forces the given (constant-drift Brownian motion) diffusion for the exchange rate to stay within a band [a, b] . The optimal policy is shown to be the following: When the process is in (a, b), no interventions should be made. When the process reaches the value a or b, respectively, an intervention should be made which makes the exchange rate jump inside its band to points a or fl, respectively, where a < t~ < fl < b.
Our approach differs from that of Jeanblanc-Picqu~ mainly in two ways. First, we do not necessarily require that the process stays within a given band [a, b] but there is a given function which determines the cost of leaving a certain implicit exchange rate band. Secondly and more importantly, we allow for two types of control, namely both discrete-time foreign exchange interventions and continuoustime interest rate control. Mathematically, this leads to a combination of impulse control and (continuous) stochastic control. Moreover, we assume that the currency band is not necessarily credible and may be exposed to speculative attacks. In particular, when the domestic currency moves above (below) its central parity, there may be expectations of further depreciations (appreciations), leading to higher (lower) domestic interest rates. The central bank may pe,mit the domestic interest rate to rise to a certain level above the foreign interest rate. When an optimal level is attained, the central bank applies its second instrument for affecting the exchange rate, namely foreign exchange interventions. We determine the optimal timing and amount of such interventions. We then derive an optimal distance of the exchange rate from its parity at which interventions are to take place, and the overall costs of applying the two instruments are minimized.
A mathematical model for the optimal control of the exchange rate
Here we will present a model based on the theory of combined stochastic control, of how the government can minimize the total costs of large exchange rate deviation from its central parity, the costs of interventions and of the interest rate differentials. For more background and details we refer to Brekke and Oksendal (1996) .
Let Y, = the exchange rate at time t (the number of domestic currency units required to buy a unit of foreign currency). If Y, is high then the domestic currency is weak, if Y, is low then the currency is strong.
We denote the central pario' by m. The government tries to keep Y, within an optimal interval containing m. For this purpose the government has two control possibilities: 1. By choosing the domestic buerest rate r,. Authorities will set a higher interest rate to compensate the investors for a weak national currency, so that these investors get a higher return by investing in the domestic country. If this policy is successful, that is, investors obtain enough interest income to compensate them for a depreciating currency, investors will begin to buy the domestic currency, and as a consequence this currency becomes more valuable and the exchange rate goes down and moves back toward the central parity. This type of control r= (r,),~ tt is called the continuous control. The set of all continuous controls is denoted by U. 2. At selected times the domestic country can use its international reserves to intervene in the foreign exchange market. The effect of intervening by buying (selling) foreign currency is to make the national currency weaker (stronger). So the national currency becomes less (more) valuable and the exchange rate goes up (down). This kind of control is applied only at discrete, selected (stochastic) times 0j and with selected amounts ~i at these times. The double sequence A rapidly fluctuating, unpredictable exchange rate is bad for the country because of the uncertainty that it creates to the corresponding market participants. On the other hand. the application of the controls w= (r. v) to stabilize the exchange rate is also costly and therefore one tries to apply the controls in an optimal way. High domestic interest rates can cause high social costs and it can be very undesirable at times when the country is facing some recession for example. Certainly, the amount of reserves that a country possesses is not unlimited either, even tbougil the ERM countries have large facilities of credit lines for borrowing reserves. All of this is, however, costly.
Let ?, denote the foreign interest rate at time t. We assume that if i', = ~, and there are no central bank interventions in the foreign exchange market, then the exchange rate Y, will behave like Brownian motion. B,. and one can expect to be in a pure float exchange rate regime.
Let --F(r, -~,) denote the effect on the exchange rate produced by the interest rate differential r r -~:r. It is natural to assume that F has graphically the following form:
More precisely, F is concave, increasing and we have
The form that we assume for F tells us that the effect of the interest rate differentials on the exchange rate decreases as the interest rate differentials increase. T~'erefore high levels of the domestic interest rate in relation to the foreign one are ineffective. When this becomes so, the central bank may consider it optimal to intervene in the foreign exchange market.
Let ~/(~) denote the effect on the exchange rate obtained by intervening by buying (if ~ > 0) or selling (if ~ < 0) the ~mount ~ of foreign currency. Again it is natural to assume that ",/is concave, perhaps linear. Moreover, y( ~: ) > 0 ~, ~ > 0.
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Similarly here, the marginal effectiveness of a central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market may decrease with the absolute amount of intervention.
Hence, if the combined stochastic control w = (J,, (01, 02. -.
• ; ~l, ~2, " "" )) is applied to the exchange rate Y,, it gets the form E (l)
where o-> 0 is a constant, ?, the foreign interest rate and B,(co); ~o ~ g/denotes Brownian motion.
Suppose that the discount rate is p > 0 and that the cost rate for the society of having the exchange rate Yt is K(Y,-m), where K(x)>_ 0 for all x. Let R(r, -~1) >-0 be the cost rate of having an interest rate differentiai r, -?t and suppose that the cost of applying the impulse control ~/ at time 0j is L(~:/) > 0.
Put x= (s, y) . Then the total, discounted expected cost of applying the combined intervention control w = (r t, (01, .
where T_< ~ is a given (fixed) future time and E" denotes expectation with respect to the probability law of Yt starting at y. Notice that we do not a priori assume symmetric costs for intervening (buying and selling foreign currency). In reality it may be the case that the latter is more costly than the former because the loss of reserves is more negative to the country than the accumulation of reserves.
wE;7/'" where ~" denotes the set of all combined stochastic controls. Moreover, find w '~ ~" such that A(x)=J"~ (., -)
i.e. w* is a corresponding optimal combined stochastic control. The function J"(x) is the total expected cost that one incurs by starting from the state x = (s, y) and applying the control w. Therefore, A(x) represents the minimal total expected cost when the state of the system starts at x.
A(x) is called the t'ahte of the system at state x.
Solution method to Problem 1. From now on we assume that ~, = ~(t) is deterministic and we only consider Markm" i~terest rate controls, i.e. interest rate controls of the form r,(to) = r(t,Yr(to)) for some function r: R-" ~ R.
Then if there are no (impulse controls) interventions in the tbreign exchange market by the central bank, the process 
which is defined for all functions f: R-" ~ R for which the derivatives involved exist at x = (s, v). If w= (r, c) is a combined stochastic control we put (with a slight abuse of notation) rs+,
[;] =.,.
The probability law of X] ''~ is denoted by Q'"' and the expectation w.r.t. Q~" is denoted by E ''''~ or just E".
A continuous function ~b: R ~ R is called stochasticalh" C'-w.r.t, the Ito diffusion X, = X~ ') if the following generalized Dynkin fonmda holds: Remark. This concept was introduced in Brekke and Oksendal (1991) . There it was proved that, under certain conditions, a function ~b which is C' (continuously differentiable) everywhere and C-" (twice continuously differentiable) outside a 'thin' set (w.r.t. the Green measure GX( • ) of X,) is stochastically C 2. Define the switching operator ,g/ by
for all Borel functions h: R 2 ~ R..~/is a non-linear operator, h -->.I/h, mapping bounded measurable functions into bounded measurable functions. Suppose that for each (s, y) the infimum in Eq. (7) is achieved by at least one ~= t~(s,y)~ R and let ~=S~),(s,y) be a measurable selection of such (s. If h is a cost function then we may regard .//h(x) as the minimal cost we can achieve by an intervention in the foreign exchange market at x. assuming that the central bank must intervene. Such an intervention of size ~ transforms the state from vto v+y(s c),
Using a result of Brekke and Oksendal (1996) we now get: 
Remark. D defined by Eq. (13) is called the continuation region. No intervention in the foreign exchange market should be made while X, is in D, only the optimal continuous control (interest rate) 71. When X, reaches aD we apply an (impulse control) intervention control (according to Eq. (15) above), which will bring X r back into D (inside the currency band). Thus the optimal amount ~+t to selI (buy) at time 0k÷ i is the (measurably selected) value of ~ which gives the minimum of X~} g( ~) := *(Ok+ ,. 0~. +y(sc))+L(.~)e -'"'''
For a proof see Brekke and Oksendal (1996, Theorem 3.1) . For a related result (which, however, is insufficient for our application) see Theorem 2 in Perthame (1984) .
A special case
As an illustration we consider the special case when the functions in the model have the following forms, which seem reasonable as a first approximation for the model: I. The function F(x) which gives the effect of the interest rate differential x on the exchange rate, is given by 
where 
J"(x)=JW(s,y)=E " e-O'(K(Y,)+13r~)dt+~e-P°,(c+Al~l J
(
2~ bv
Note that this value of a is our candidate for the optimal interest rate control ~(s, y).
For this value of a the left hand side of Eq. (23) 
The interval (-r/, r/) can be interpreted as the band of "admissible" exchange rate values, or the "no intervention band' (where there will not be any central bank interventions in the foreign exchange market). Hence the exchange rate values -7/ and 7/are the "trigger' levels for intervention in the foreign exchange market by the central bank.
Then from Eq. (27) we get
Eq. (30) has the form
where
By symmetry it is enough to consider the case when y > 0. From the general theory of ordinary differential equations (see e.g. Birkhoff and Rota, 1989, Theorem 8, p. 190) we know that there exists T > 0 (the explosion time) such that for any choice of initial values f(0), f'(0) Eq. (3 I) has a unique solution ~b =f(y) for y < T. In particular, for each given z> 0 we let f( y) = f=( y); 0<y< T be the unique solution of
We now assume that there exists : > 0 such that for at least two different values of v ~ (0, T), say Yt < Y., < T, we have
From now on we choose yt < y, to be the two smallest positive numbers with this property.
We also assume that f~'(y,) > 0
We now choose 7/(the exchange rate trigger level for intervention) as follows: 
Remark. To illustrate that the situation Eqs. (3a) and (35) (40) is the optimal intervention size and this pushes the exchange rate from r/back to the level Yl: 
is the calue fiuwtion of Problem 2. Moreover, the corresponding optimal combined stochastic control w ~ = ( rf ~ , v * ) = ( r, ~ , ( Ol*, 0; _" .... " ~l*, ~, f , ...) )is the following" Remark. The above example was discussed primarily to illustrate the content of the general model. Unlbrtunately, even in this simple case we are unable to find an exact, analytic solution. Nevertheless we can describe a few characteristics of the optimal strategy. We mention two examples:
(I) Note that by Eq. (49) the optimal interest rate r *(y) is proportional to ~b'(y). Therelbre the maximal value of r ~ (y) occurs at the point v= ¢" where 0'(y) is maximal. By Eqs. (34) and (35) 
£'(.~) =0 (53)
Note in particular that .x'j < (" < y_~ = r/. Thus we get the perhaps surprising conclusion that r :"(3') is not maximal at the trigger level rl for intervention, but before this level is reached. This means that (in our model) the interest rate control r~" becomes relatively costly/ineffective (and hence should be reduced) as the exchange rate increases beyond ~ and approaches the trigger level for intervening. (II) It is an interesting question how the optimal strategy depends on the minimum cost of intervention, c. The value of ~b at a given point y will depend on c, so we have 0(Y) = 0(c, 3'). Similarly the numbers Yl and r/depends on c: y~ = yl(c), r/= r/(c). Therefore Eq. (47) 
In particular, this implies that the value function is more sensi+:,ve to an increase in the minimum cost c of intervening (by impulse control) in the foreign exchange market near the trigger value r/than at y~. This is natural since an approach of the exchange re~te towards r/ makes intervention indispensable and a fixed cost c therefore plays an important role.
(lid Since ~(c, y) decreases when c decreases for fixed y+ we can define ~b(O. 
If Eq. (59) holds, this means that no matter how small the minimum intervention cost c > 0 is, the optimal strategy remains of impulse control type with the size of the jump (from 7/(c) to y~(c)) bounded away from zere.
The conclusion is surprising, since if we start out with the assumption that c = 0, then it is reasonable to expect that an optimal strategy will be to intervene infinitesimally (if A > O) every time the exchange rate Yt reaches certain trigger values +.E (See e.g. Krugman, 1991, Froot and Obstfeld, 1991a , and see also the related problem discussed in Davis and Normann, 1990 .) So if this is correct, then we would expect to have yl(0) = rt(O) = ~ and the resulting optimal exchange rate process to be a Brownian motion in [-~, ~] reflected at the boundary +~. (We emphasize that if c > 0 then by Eq. (21) infinitesimal interventions are not optimal.) (7. Mu,')daca. B. Oksendal / Jotmud of Mathemati,'al Economics 29 (1098) [225] [226] [227] [228] [229] [230] [231] [232] [233] [234] [235] [236] [237] [238] [239] [240] [241] [242] [243] Eq. (58) is not quite so dramatic, but still expresses a non-smooth relation between the intervention cost c and the value function ~b near c = 0.
Final remarks
The main purpose of this paper has been to find a mathematical formulation of the problem of controlling optimally (under uncertainty) the exchange rate by means of I. the domestic interest rate and 2. interventions in the form of buying or selling large amounts of foreign currency.
We have proposed a mathematical model consisting of a combined stochastic control/impulse control problem and we have given a sufficient condition for its solution in terms of quasivariational Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman inequalities Eqs. (8)-(16). In general there seems to be little hope of obtaining explicit solutions. However, the model may still give some a new insight, it is a demanding task to find efficient numerical solution methods. We leave this for future research.
